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Economic development planning has increasingly become a primary function of state 
governments. Imbued with extensive powers, state economic development authorities and other 
special entities utilize incentives and other techniques to attract and retain businesses within a 
community in order to bring increased growth, jobs and tax revenues. However, the economic 
development planning undertaken by these organizations often lacks rigorous evaluation 
methods or concrete development goals, with state agencies instead going about economic 
development with good intentions, but bad practices. This is troubling because these entities 
utilize vast sums of state revenue and expansive powers, such as eminent domain, to engage in 
economic development without a clear understanding of what the outcomes and impacts of state 
actions will be. 
 Atlantic City, New Jersey serves as a unique case study for this form of economic 
development. Since the legalization of casino gaming in the city in 1976, the State of New Jersey 
has been heavily involved in the development of the city’s economy and has engaged in large-
scale urban renewal programming as a form of economic development. Through a variety of 
agencies, including the Casino Reinvestment Development Authority and New Jersey Economic 
Development Authority, the State has utilized a variety of economic development practices 
including eminent domain, tax credits and incentives to go about the redevelopment of Atlantic 
City.  
 Through the exploration of three specific development programs undertaken by the State: 
eminent domain, financial incentives, and public-private partnerships, this thesis critically 
evaluates the economic policies of the State of New Jersey in order to provide detailed analysis 
of the impacts and outcomes of these policies, including those traditionally overlooked by 
economic development practitioners. Ultimately, concluding that the State’s use of economic 
development planning has been inadequate and at times run contrary to a holistic economic 
development strategy intended to uplift a very depressed and economically disadvantaged 






Economic development planning has increasingly become a focus of state resources and 
energy. States and local municipalities utilize large amounts of government funds and exercise 
the powers of the state to improve and promote a jurisdictions economy. This form of 
development planning incorporates a wide variety of policies, incentives, tax breaks and other 
strategies to prime the pump of economic development. Typical of economic development 
planning is a focus on job creation and taxable growth. Municipalities implement different 
systems of incentives to create new economic development, with this wide variety of economic 
development techniques implemented across the country, it becomes difficult to accurately 
assess or compare a municipality’s success at implementing economic development policies.  
Since 1976 the State of New Jersey has been engaged in a unique economic development 
strategy in Atlantic City: legalized casino gaming. The constitutional amendment that legalized 
gaming heralded casino development as  “a unique tool for urban redevelopment for Atlantic 
City” (N.J. Stat. Ann §5:12-1 to 190, 1976), and since its legalization, Atlantic City has utilized 
large beachfront casino development as the primary driver of the local economy, with the state 
receiving millions of dollars yearly from taxes on casino revenue. Currently over 30% of the 
Atlantic City economy is related to hospitality services, primarily as a result of the large casino 
industry (see Figure 1.1). The city has gone through periods of great success, but more recently it 
has been in a long period of decline, as fewer tourists visit the city and casino gaming becomes 
legal in adjacent states (Fabricant, 2005). Since 2014, five of Atlantic City’s twelve casinos have 
closed, including the former “eighth wonder of the world,” the Trump Taj Mahal, which closed 






The State of New Jersey has played a very important and controlling role in the economic 
development of Atlantic City establishing a number of agencies to oversee a variety of 
development programs within the city. These policies and strategies, utilized for the 
redevelopment of the city, provide for a unique study of economic development planning in the 
United States.  
Focusing on state economic development policy and practice, this thesis explores how 
New Jersey has utilized condemnation; grant programs, and public-private partnerships (PPP) as 
well as other incentives to redevelop Atlantic City. It seeks to critically examine economic 
development policy, evaluate project goals, programmatic outcomes, and community-wide 
impacts of economic redevelopment, including those unexamined by the State in its economic 
development calculus. The ultimate objective being to analyze government redevelopment 
activities in order to make recommendations on how economic development planning can be 
better implemented in Atlantic City.  
The primary subject of this thesis is the New Jersey’s Casino Reinvestment Development 
Authority (CRDA), which has been the primary State economic development entity in Atlantic 
City, since its founding in 1984. In addition, this thesis explores recent economic development 
projects undertaken by the state in varying capacities, including the recent use of PPP, and the 
New Jersey Economic Development Authority’s (NJEDA), Economic Redevelopment and 
Growth Grant program (ERG). While this history of economic development planning in Atlantic 
City is extensive, the focus of this thesis is on economic development post-2011, when the New 
Jersey Legislature expanded the CRDA’s powers in Atlantic City and shifted its development 





Figure 1.3 Atlantic City Tourism District 
 








Atlantic City’s economic redevelopment is uncertain. Its continuing reliance on the failed 
casino gaming industry as primary driver of development has left Atlantic City broke and with 
few assets. New planning, driven by the CRDA, has refocused the economy away from 
gambling, but still places a heavy emphasis on Atlantic City’s tourism industry whose failure in 
the 1960’s first prompted the State to legalize casino gaming. The ambiguous “claim anything 
that falls” model of economic development is not enough when the solvency of the City and the 
livelihood of so many community members are at stake. With the State’s increasingly heavy 
involvement in the economic development and management of Atlantic City additional analysis 
and evaluation must be done to ensure that the policies being implemented by the State in 
Atlantic City are in fact improving the economic development of the community, including local 
businesses and residents and not solely improving the well-being of select developers who utilize 
public economic development incentives for private gains.  
Investigating policy effectiveness and creating a critical methodology for evaluating 
economic development is crucial to the creation of improved economic development policy 
throughout the United States. Considering the ambiguities of economic development, the review 
and evaluation of development policy is crucial for improving and refining future development 
policy. From this research and analysis New Jersey and Atlantic City development practitioners 
will be better able to evaluate the impacts and outcomes of policy action, with the hope that 
future polocies could be modified to achieve more beneficial outcomes. Outside of Atlantic City, 
development professionals will be more informed regarding economic development strategies 
and how these techniques could be better incorporated into local development practice. Over all, 
the research suggests new insights into economic development and perhaps the movement away 
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from the ambiguous “claim anything that falls” model into a more clear and holistic model of 


























Literature Review  
 
Establishing a Precedent for Critical Economic Development Policy 
 
 Economic development is comprised of a variety of activities, with every state and 
municipality in the United States subscribing to a different method and strategy to promote local 
economic development. The most common form of economic development practiced across the 
United States is the provision of location and retention incentive policies, often focusing on 
specific firms or attracting specific industries to a community (Porter, 2000; Markusen, 2007). 
This practice includes incentives such as large tax abatements on property or payroll and 
discounted municipal utility rates (Porter, 2000).  Frequently, economic development entities 
work closely with other entities of the State to produce a coordinated and comprehensive strategy 
to attract a potential firm in a highly competitive environment where the municipality is also 
competing with its direct neighbors as well as other municipalities across the United States. 
While economic development through firm- specific incentives is the most common strategy 
across the United States, these types of economic development policies tend to be highly 
inefficient and often revenue negative for the municipality (Bartik, 1991). This is because the 
regional competition to locate firms often creates a municipal a race to the bottom where two 
communities compete to offer the best relocation incentives to a company (Fisher and Peters, 
2004). Nevertheless, these direct subsidies remain common due to challenges associated with 
implementing other types of policy and evaluating the impacts of economic development.  
Given local economic development’s highly specific nature and the complexities around 
quantifying local economic impacts, this incentive-focused programming is difficult to measure 
and compare. Frequently the only evaluation that is done is the aggregation of quantitative 
metrics, such as job creation, without a more critical evaluation of the local outcomes of policy 
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(Clarke and Gaile, 1992). While quantitative evaluation provides some insight into development 
policy, a more critical evaluation of development goals and policy outcomes is required to 
understand the full impact of state economic development policy (Fasenfest and Reese, 1997).  
This lack of consistent or critical evaluation standards coupled with the strong political 
pressure felt by economic development entities to implement specific types of projects makes 
economic development evaluation “a quagmire of good intentions and bad measures” (Clarke 
and Gaile, 1992, p. 193), often resulting in development practitioners taking on a “shoot anything 
that flies, claim anything that falls” mentality to their work (Ruben, 1988, p. 237). The 
ambiguities of local economic development policy therefore create a condition where a 
practitioner may engage in development actions, or offer millions of dollars in incentives without 
a clear understanding of what the result of these actions will be, or even an effective 
methodology to measure the consequences of this spending. This results in an improvisational 
strategy to economic development, which lacks rigorous evaluation of the policy and only a 
vague understanding of a policy's success or failure, precluding an economic development 
entity’s ability to learn from past mistakes or improve economic development practice in the 
future.  
 This lack of consistent or robust evaluation methods requires practitioners and planning 
scholars to be more critical in their analysis of economic development programming (Shapiro, 
1981). Important to this critical analysis is a study of economic development actors and their 
actions, specifically understanding the social and political structures in which the development 
actors engage in when enacting development policy (Beauregard, 1993 p.268).  Solely following 
the “claim anything that falls” (Ruben, 1988) model of economic development is problematic 
because it legitimizes certain acts and consequences without the necessary rationale or evidence 
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to support the program’s implementation or continuation. Further, this model delegitimizes other 
impacts of policies that do not fit into the political narrative of economic development. Often in 
economic development practice “’economic’ is an ideological statement meant to deflect 
attention from the inherently political nature of economic development” (Beauregard, 1993 
p.269), and solely allowing actors to claim unambiguous economic successes allows 
programmatic failures or unintended consequences to be ignored, again reducing the ability for 
development policy to be reworked or improved. This is why critical evaluation away from 
quantitative measures needs to be utilized when evaluating economic development policy.  
Job growth is one metric for quantifying economic development success currently 
utilized by practitioners. However, continuing Beauregard’s discussion of economic as an 
ideological term, growth also becomes a political term that must be examined and evaluated. An 
economic development practitioner whose imperative is to pursue economic growth as measured 
by increased jobs, will likely ignore the tradeoffs between efficiency and equity in public 
investment, leaving out an analysis of “growth for whom?” when developing and implementing 
economic development programming (Fainstein, 2010).  
This oversight allows for projects to be interpreted as successes solely by the large 
number of people employed, without understanding the types or quality of jobs created. In 
Atlantic City, this is especially important, as the tourist economy is highly seasonal. While jobs 
may be created through developing tourist attractions, employment is unlikely to be full time or 
year round. In addition, the numerical quantification of jobs “fails to indicate that economic 
development, as a process and a practice is a long term, ongoing enterprise” (Feser and Malizia, 
1999 p.13). Instead practitioners seek quantifiable growth, which can be benchmarked and 
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tracked year to year, instead of working towards creating robust long-term changes and resilience 
in a city’s economy (Malizia, 1990).  
State economic development policies in the United States must not only be understood as 
altruistic planning done to benefit communities, but also as a product of increasing State control 
of municipal and urban entities (Nickels, 2016). In the United States municipalities are provided 
their authority through the devolution of power from the State, and while these powers 
traditionally have been sacrosanct, states, including New Jersey have begun to roll back 
municipal powers, particularly as it relates to municipal spending and budgets, as part of a larger 
move towards more conservative governance. Based on neoliberal principals of the shrinking 
state and the broad reduction of government services to a community municipal takeovers and 
other austerity policies, are frequently implemented in times of municipal financial distress. 
(Peck, 2012).   
In New Jersey, the power to take over a municipality is articulated in the Local 
Government Supervision Act (LGSA), which empowers the state to "make provision for the 
imposition of special restraints upon municipalities in, or in danger of falling into, unsound 
financial condition and in this way to forestall serious defaults upon local obligations and 
demoralized finances that burden local taxpayers and destroy the efficiency of local services” 
(N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BB-54, 2001). This law has been utilized by the State to slash 
municipal budgets through renegotiating labor contracts and pension plans of municipal workers 
along with other austerity measures. The legislation has also been used to privatize municipal 
utilities such as water and sewerage (Nickels, 2016, p.198). While the sale of municipal assets 
can generate capital quickly and remove an expensive public service from the books, it also 
removes a crucial non-property tax source of revenue, making a city even more reliant on 
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property taxes to fund municipal activity, which according to the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), will not rebound nationally until 2040, significantly limiting a municipality’s 
ability to rise out of an unsound or precarious financial condition (Peck, 2012, p. 627).  
These severe austerity policies are not the only way to address economic problems, and 
in the context of economic development these policies impede a community’s growth. Municipal 
jobs are often some of the few quality jobs available in a community, providing a living wage, 
strong pension and labor representation. Additionally, public assets can be better leveraged to 
help generate strong economic development if kept in a municipality’s control as opposed to 
being sold to a private operator. Over 100 municipal workers have already been fired in Atlantic 
City due to the austerity policies placed upon the City government by the State (Burdo, 2016). 
The threat is that the State’s search for ambiguous growth and immediate economic returns will 
limit the potential success of economic development planning and Atlantic City’s ability to 
create a diverse and sustainable economy.  
In Atlantic City, community advocacy groups such as the NAACP and ACLU have 
spoken out against the state takeover, citing the erosion of democratic principles of local self-
governance. They are particularly wary of the racial and social implications this policy promotes, 
namely the perception that poor, mostly African American urban communities are incapable of 
managing themselves and instead need a heavy handed suburban State government to do so 
(Braun, 2016; Giroux, 2006; Polmar, 2017). Due to the extensive powers provided to the 
Governor and his agents by the LGSA, additional concerns regarding the state’s austerity 
policies have been raised, specifically relating to how much power the executive has in 
controlling state takeover of a municipality.  Citing New Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s open 
advocacy for the privatization of public utilities and the involvement of George Norcross III (an 
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insurance executive, whose brother, Philip, represents New Jersey American Water), in Atlantic 
City’s fiscal takeover, some worry that strict austerity policies are underpinned by more than 
responsible governance, and could involve the selling of Atlantic City’s water supply to a private 
company for both ideological and personal-political reasons (Hetrick & Post, 2016; Walsh, 2016; 
Atlantic City Resident, 2017).  
 
Exploring the History of Casino Driven Economic Development in Atlantic City 
 
State economic development policy in Atlantic City focused on growth based on 
developing the casino economy as a catalyst for the expansion of the City’s tourism industry. 
The original intent was to have casino visitors spill out onto the streets and enjoy the other 
amenities, such as nightclubs and dance halls, producing an economic trickle-down effect. In 
theory as casinos succeeded, so would the adjacent businesses, increasing jobs, and importantly 
for the economically depressed region, increase real estate values. This trickle down policy 
sought to raise property values in areas adjacent to casino development in order to increase taxes 
collected (Eadington, 1996).  
For the State, the legalization of gambling was a very effective tool for increasing real 
estate values. However as real estate value is primarily connected to a properties location and 
association with a location, the legalization of gambling made real estate more expensive without 
changing the property’s physical condition or use value, creating blocks of expensive but poor 
quality properties (Fainstein, 1994; Rubenstein, 1984). While proximity to casinos made 
property more valuable, this was due to increased speculative development and not material 
changes to the housing stock, producing an extreme imbalance in the market, which favored 
property speculators over residents.  
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Large casino development created a large speculative real estate market which 
significantly increased the value of old residential buildings adjacent to beachfront casinos. 
Between 1978 and 1980 speculation brought assessed property values up in areas from $8-$9 a 
square foot to as high as $150 per square foot (Rubenstein, 1984 p.68). In addition, Atlantic 
City’s use of eminent domain to support casino developments contributed to decreased 
investment in local residential property. Largely done as a service to ease casino’s expansion, the 
State’s use of condemnation disincentivized landlords, particularly in the South Inlet, Gardener’s 
Basin and along the Boardwalk, to improve their properties, prompting landlords to walk away 
from these properties, leaving many buildings abandoned and many houses became victims of 
arson (Anastasia, 1981; Hawkins, 1982, p. 94).  
Even success in promoting Atlantic City and increasing visitors during the 1980’s and 
1990’s did not translate into larger urban economic development (Braunlich, 1996 p.56). While 
casinos and the City rebuilt the iconic Boardwalk, the rest of Atlantic City did not receive the 
same level of investment. In “Casino Gambling in Atlantic City: Issues of Development and 
Redevelopment” Rubenstein (1984) identifies two primary reasons for the failure of this trickle 
down development strategy. First, casino design and management, which discouraged external 
interactions or cooperation, placed casino success in opposition to larger community successes. 
Second, the development of casinos along the boardwalk produced large-scale land speculation 
in adjacent areas, causing massive residential displacement and the abandonment of former 
middle income and seasonal residential neighborhoods hollowing out Atlantic City’s working 
class.  
Designed to be all-inclusive resorts, casinos focus on keeping visitors within their walls 
for the longest time possible. Gaming floors are notorious for eliminating clocks and mirrors, in 
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an effort to disorientate the guest. Further, state regulations banning gambling from being visible 
to the public prevent natural light from reaching gaming parlors, creating very confusing and 
“labyrinthine” spaces (Morini, 2017). Gamblers are purposefully dislocated with the intent of 
keeping them at the blackjack table or slot machine (Freidman, 2000). Casinos in Atlantic City 
have continuously resisted banning smoking indoors because it would result in gamblers 
stepping away from the slots, hurting the casino’s bottom line (Casino Connection, 2006). A 
casino’s exterior design also follows similar tenets; while on the whole architectural spectacles, 
casinos pay little attention to the smaller scales, particularly the pedestrian experience and urban 
streetscape interface, seen in Figure 3.1. While opulent from certain angles, Atlantic City’s 
casinos were built block after block with large monolithic concrete walls at the pedestrian level. 
Although New Jersey’s original intent was for casino success to lift up the city’s 
economy, casino developers and the business model insisted on a system that shunned Atlantic 
City as a community. Focusing on retaining gamblers within their tightly controlled spaces, as 
seen in Figure 3.2. Some long-time Atlantic City residents went so far as to claim casinos have 
benefited from the unsafe and unclean condition of Atlantic City because it kept visitors, and 
their money, inside the large resort casino complexes (Polmar, 2017; Atlantic City Resident, 
2017). 
                
Figure 3.1 Revel Casino at street level        Figure 3.2 Tropicana Casino 
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Background & Context 
 
Background to Atlantic City’s Economic Development 
  
In 1976 Atlantic City became the only municipality on the East Coast to allow casino 
gaming. Once legalized, gaming became a state supported monopoly both supported and 
regulated by New Jersey, and this “mere availability” of gambling was enough to guarantee the 
early economic success of Atlantic City’s casinos (Roehl, 1996 p.61). New Jersey heavily 
regulated the casino industry placing substantial taxes on gaming revenues, but because Atlantic 
City was the only opportunity for gambling east of the Mississippi River, the casinos found early 
success (Eadington, 1996). But this initial prosperity gave way to pressure from other resorts 
established in adjacent states disrupting the success of New Jersey’s unique economic 
development experiment.  
Atlantic City’s initial monopoly on East Coast gaming lasted for 16 years, as casinos on 
Native American reservations and further legalization of “racino” gambling in neighboring 
northeastern states significantly reduced the regional demand for a single gaming destination and 
ultimately shrunk the city’s market share. Foxwoods Resort Casino opened in 1992, only one 
year before Trump’s Taj Mahal, soon became the highest grossing casino in the United States, 
breaking Atlantic City’s monopoly and taking a substantial portion of the Northeast gaming 
revenue (Braunlich, 1996 p.55). As saturation of the market increased, Atlantic City’s casino 
industry began to stagnate; first table games lost revenue, followed by the more robust slot 
machines (Center for Gaming Research, 2016). As seen in Figure 4.1 casino revenue has 
consistently decreased from 2006 onwards only rebounding in 2016 after the State legalized 
online gaming, which does nothing for the City’s tourist economy.  
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Competition from outside Atlantic City resulted in not just the stagnation of the casino 
economy, but also the stagnation of the city’s economy, prompting the State to reexamine its 
economic development strategies. New policies incentivized the creation of casino resorts, such 
as the Borgata Hotel Casino and Spa, which opened in 2003, to remain competitive with new 
facilities built in other states (Stansfield 1998). Yet even with these new development strategies 
and the intensive state support for casino-based tourism, since 2008 Atlantic City’s casinos have 
recorded consistent losses. Since 2014, five casinos including the $2.4 billion Revel Casino and 
Trump Taj Mahal have closed. New Jersey’s recent legalization of online casino gaming made 
2016 the first year the city’s casinos recorded increased revenue from gaming in over a decade. 
While beneficial to the State Treasury this legalization of online gaming did little to reverse the 
decline in visitors to Atlantic City or to improve the city’s economy.  
New Jersey’s original Casino Control Act (CCA)(1976) and subsequent casino 
regulations directed portions of casino profits to the redevelopment of Atlantic City and New 
Jersey. However, these original state regulations did not produce their desired impacts due to the 
poor coordination of State policy and significant tax loopholes written into the legislation 
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(Rubenstein, 1984 p. 68). Primarily, this legislation promulgated the property speculation that 
began almost immediately after its passage on properties adjacent to casinos along the 
Boardwalk and Atlantic and Pacific Avenues. State inaction to prevent speculation coupled with 
highly selective tax reassessment and unplanned casino driven rezoning produced large numbers 
of property sales by speculative investors hoping to sell to the next casino developer, driving out 
existing Atlantic City residents, who could no longer afford to live in Atlantic City (Rubenstein, 
1984 p. 70).  
By 1980, the use value of residential property dropped significantly in comparison to the 
property’s exchange value in the real estate market. While casino development raised land prices 
and increased the amount of tax collected by the State, it forced working and middle class 
residents out of Atlantic City and into Atlantic County suburbs, an unanalyzed consequence of 
casino-driven economic development. This failure of policy forced the State of New Jersey to 
again reexamine its development strategy in order to better manage and coordinate casino-based 
reinvestment. This led to the State’s creation of the CRDA in 1984.  
The CRDA’s original mission was to develop blighted areas of Atlantic City and fund 
urban redevelopment programs in New Jersey at large. Instead of expecting casinos to fund 
reinvestment on their own as legislated by the original CCA, the State endowed the CRDA with 
the power to issue tax-free bonds which were then bought by casinos in lieu of the previous 
redevelopment tax, known as the investment alternative tax (IAT) (N.J Stat. Ann §5:12-
114.1a(2)). Originally these bonds primarily financed affordable housing in Atlantic City, but as 
Downey (1990) articulates, the implementation of this investment was highly problematic: “first 
Atlantic City has not proven itself to be a good market place for this level of housing. Second 
such exclusive concentration [of low income housing] runs contrary to the original intent of the 
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CCA” (Downey, 1990 p.713-714). While Atlantic City’s housing stock diminished through 
speculation-driven filtering and the abandonment of lower valued residential properties on high 
valued lots, the need for low-income housing was neither as strong as the CRDA’s housing study 
suggested, nor did it promote a complete revitalization for Atlantic City, which was the intent of 
the CCA (Downey, 1990 p.717).  
According to Downey’s analysis, while alleviating substandard housing was an important 
and substantial portion of the State’s urban redevelopment and neighborhood reinvestment plan, 
it became the primary focus of the CRDA. Instead of considering all the needs of the community, 
such as commercial and community development projects, the CRDA exclusively focused on the 
creation of affordable housing at the expense of other types of development. Downy argues that 
this interpretation of the CCA did not meet the “framer’s intent”, which instructs that the CRDA 
fund “a broad, gradual redevelopment of all aspects of the city “(Downey, 1990 p.719-720; 
Lampen, 1982). While the CRDA created housing, these low-income residential projects lacked 
the necessary services and local commercial amenities necessary to create community wide 
redevelopment. The result of these policies was instead increased middle class flight from 
Atlantic City to new suburban housing in Atlantic County suburbs, leaving only the poorest of 
Atlantic City’s residents increasingly concentrated in poverty directly adjacent to new, and 
opulent billion dollar casinos like the Trump Taj Mahal.  
 In 2011, the New Jersey State legislature passed the Atlantic City Tourism District Act 
(C. 5-12-218), again amending the role of the CRDA in Atlantic City’s redevelopment. This 
legislation expanded the powers of the CRDA through its takeover of the Atlantic City 
Convention and Visitors Authority (ACCVA) with the purpose of  “maintaining public 
confidence in the casino gaming industry as ‘a unique tool of urban redevelopment for the city of 
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Atlantic City’ and to directly facilitate the redevelopment of existing blighted areas…” (New 
Jersey P.L. 1984 c.218, 2011 p.2) To achieve this, the CRDA was given additional powers 
including “[the power] to exercise the right of eminent domain in the City of Atlantic City… 
establish an ‘Atlantic City Tourism District’… impose land use regulations… and adopt a 
tourism district master plan…” (New Jersey P.L. 1984 c218, 2011 p.5-8). Further, the legislation 
provided New Jersey even more expansive powers over the redevelopment of Atlantic City, 
mandating that if Atlantic City was unable or unwilling to comply with CRDA land use 
decisions, “the Department of Community Affairs shall… assume jurisdiction over the Atlantic 
City Planning and Zoning Departments to provide that the authority shall receive the necessary 
assistance… in its implementation of the tourism district master plan” (New Jersey P.L. 1984 
c218, 2011 p.9).  
 With this legislation, the CRDA expanded its role as provider of economic development 
funding to include a more traditional role as an urban renewal entity, focusing on addressing 
urban blight. In 2012, the CRDA produced the Tourism District Master Plan, a document that set 
the goals and objectives of CRDA-driven development; in the “Vision” section, the Master Plan 
sets out to develop “a strategic framework for near-term, mid-term and long-term project and 
policy initiatives that will enhance the visitor experience, stimulate private investment and 
improve the financial stability of Atlantic City” (CRDA, 2012 Sec 4.1.2), emphasizing the 
State’s objective of promoting tourism as the primary industry of Atlantic City. The plan’s 
designated large portions of the city as the Atlantic City Tourism District and further identified 
areas for specific policy and programmatic initiatives, including the establishment of a mixed-
use casino supported development and a new arts and cultural district seen in Figure 4.2 (CRDA, 
2012, Sec 4.2.2).   
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Figure 4.2 The Noyes Garage central to the Atlantic City Arts & Culture District 
While the stated objectives of the Master Plan were to “improve the financial stability of 
Atlantic City” (CRDA, 2012, Sec 4.1.2), the City’s lack of financial stability since 2012 has 
significantly limited the CRDA’s ability to engage in its long-term master planning, 
significantly. In 2016 Atlantic City faced a fiscal crisis so severe the State had to again readjust 
its economic development strategy for the city to resolve this most recent problem. 
 
Atlantic City’s Current Fiscal Condition and Context 
 
From March to May of 2016, the State of New Jersey and the municipal government of 
Atlantic City engaged in intense negotiations related to Atlantic City’s massive municipal budget 
shortfall. The result of this negotiation was the State’s passage of the “Casino Tax Property 
Stabilization Act” along with other legislative acts providing Atlantic City temporary relief to its 
municipal debt. Mayor Donald “Don” Guardian indicated in an interview with National Public 
Radio that the City was just two weeks away from a municipal shutdown and default before they 
reached a resolution (Rose, 2016). At the heart of this crisis were five years of casino revenue 
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decline, coupled with large increases to the residential property tax rate increases, an issue which 
has plagued Atlantic City development since the State’s legalization of casino gaming.  
Even while the State used substantial political energy and capital to promote casino 
driven economic growth, the casinos still failed to make the profits they had in the past. The 
closure of five casinos between 2012 and 2016, significantly affected the amount of tax revenue 
received by the City (Rose, 2016; Eide, 2016; Rojas, 2016). In addition to casino closures, the 
remaining casinos began certiorari proceedings against the City. Arguing that the City’s decline 
in the gaming market reduced the casinos’ property value to amounts lower than those assessed 
by the City in 2008. (Parry, 2016). In 2012, the New Jersey Tax Court ruled in favor of the 
Borgata Hotel Casino and Spa’s certiorari claim and cut the property’s assessed value from $2.2 
billion to $880 million. It further ordered the City to pay back $62.5 million from tax year 2009-
2010 and additionally provide Borgata with the right to settle for tax years 2011-2014, at $88.25 
million, totaling over $170 million which the City had to pay to the Borgata (Parry, 2016; 
Beeson, 2013). The decision simultaneously created a billion dollar budget shortfall for the City 
and eliminated its ability to raise $170 million by slashing the amount of money casinos 
contributed to Atlantic City’s property tax rolls, contributing to the steep decline in Atlantic 
City’s ratables as seen in Figure 4.3. This, coupled with the general collapse of casino gaming 
and the closure of the five casinos including Revel, which in tax year 2012-2013 (its only full 
year in operation) accounted for 18% of Atlantic City’s ratable, created immense pressure on the 
City to cut its budget and increase revenues by any means (Associated Press, 2014; Hetrick and 




To compensate for the decrease in property tax assessed on casinos, the City began 
signifigantly raising the residential property tax rate. This was similar to what occurred during 
the property speculation of the 1980’s, with the residential tax rate increasing by 113% since 
2010 (Hetrick, 2016). In an attempt to reduce the tax burden on residential properties and bailout 
the City, the Casino Property Stabilization Act provides a 15-year local property tax exemption 
for existing “casino gaming property” or new casino improvements including hotels, parking 
lots, and conference facilities. In lieu of taxation the act establishes a formal Payment In lieu of 
Taxes (PILOT) based on yearly casino gaming earnings. In addition, the law also takes the IAT, 
formerly collected and used by the CRDA, and utilizes those funds to service the City’s 
municipal debt (Pizarro, 2015; Rojas, 2016).  
In terms of Atlantic City’s long-term economic development, these policy changes have 
been twofold. First the changes hollowed out the CRDA’s ability to fund projects based on the 
2012 Tourism Master Plan, as the CRDA no longer controls the IAT funds. Second, the bailout 
legislation provides the City with increased state oversight, not only for economic development 
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but also for all aspects of municipal governance. With this increased State control and the 
defunding of the CRDA’s IAT, to pay for the City’s debt service, the substantial and long term 
economic development planning put in place with the 2011 legislation has been severely 
weakened.  As a result new economic development strategies, including PPPs like the $210 
million “Gateway” project between South Jersey Gas, Stockton University, and the private AC 

















 This research is a critical investigation of recent economic development policies and 
practices implemented in Atlantic City by the State of New Jersey.  It evaluates the impacts and 
outcomes of economic development programs implemented since the expansion of the CRDA in 
2011 and the establishment of the Atlantic City Tourism District in 2012. Specifically, evaluated 
are the CRDA’s use of eminent domain, the use of IAT funding to incentivize economic 
development projects, the New Jersey Economic Development Authority’s ERG Grant program 
and the Gateway public-private partnership which includes a wide variety of State actors and 
private groups.  
 In “Constituting Economic Development”, Beauregard (1993) highlights the need for 
critical evaluation of economic development actors and actions to resolve the ambiguity of 
development impacts present in modern mainstream economic development planning. This 
means including particular focus on the economic development techniques utilized by different 
levels of government, and how the variety of economic development agencies in New Jersey 
interact to contribute to Atlantic City’s development. For this critical approach, techniques 
developed by Fasenfest and Reese (1997) in “What works best?: Values and the evaluation of 
local economic development policy” were used. The methodology includes: identifying 
economic development goals, conceptualizing how actions attempt to reach these development 
goals, and developing indicators to evaluate and measure the holistic impacts of economic 
development programs. Key to this analysis is the differentiation of outcomes, which are the 
direct results of an economic development program and impacts, the broader societal 
consequences of a program. Further, the political motivations of these development entities must 
be evaluated, including aspects of legislative intent, which provide insight into the goals and 
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objectives of specific policies and provides guidance for benchmarking and future programmatic 
evaluation. 
Articulated in “What works best?” “practical deliberation analysis” was utilized to 
evaluate development policy because it “explicitly addresses issues of value within the 
evaluation methodology” (Fasenfest and Reese, 1997 p. 201; Fisher, 1995), providing for critical 
analysis of economic development policy,  particularity as compared to that of the more 
normative “claim anything that falls” model (Ruben, 1988). In practical deliberation analysis, 
policy actions are evaluated on four levels: 1. Program verification – does the action do what it 
was programmed to do? 2. Situational validation- Are these outcomes appropriate remedies for 
the social and economic ills facing the community? 3. Societal vindication- Does the 
development program contribute to society? Does it favor certain interests or persons over other 
interests? 4. Social choice – Are the outcomes of the program compatible with the overall order 
in terms of social equity and appropriate for systematic change? (Fasenfest and Reese p. 201). 
Importantly, this analysis focuses not just on the stated goals and objectives of the State or 
CRDA, but how these policies impact the economic development of Atlantic City more broadly.  
Data Collection 
 
 After receiving exempt status from the Columbia University Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) in December 2016, evidence was collected through a number of methods. Primarily data 
was collected through interviews conducted with planning and economic development policy 
makers involved in Atlantic City’s redevelopment. Primary data was also collected during two 
site visits to Atlantic City conducted in January and February 2017, which focused on observing 
and evaluating the local impacts and outcomes of these economic development policies. 
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 Site visits and interviews provided information regarding specific policies, such as the 
CRDA’s IAT funding program, as well as overall goals of CRDA development policy. Seen in 
Figure 5.1 interviews were conducted during the months of January and February 2017 with 
eight individuals involved in economic development in Atlantic City to varying degrees. 
 
Historic and theoretical research was also conducted, consisting of a review of relevant 
scholarly literature and the collection of secondary data relating to Atlantic City and its 
economy. This secondary research was complemented by the study of official CRDA documents 
obtained through New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and through public 
government publications such as the net economic impacts analysis conducted by the NJEDA, as 
well as, press coverage of CRDA activities, which provided insight into the intent and purpose of 
the enabling legislation, as well as, quantifiable benchmarks to measure the success of specific 








Utilizing practical deliberation analysis as developed in Fasenfest and Reese’s “What 
works best?” This thesis explores three economic development techniques commonly utilized by 
economic development entities and how these stratigies were utilized by the State of New Jersey 
in Atlantic City. Specifically this section focuses on the CRDA’s use of eminent domain and 
traditional urban renewal programming in the South Inlet district, NJEDA and the CRDA grant 
programs developed to fund private development at the Tropicana Casino and Resort, and the 
Gateway private public partnership, between Stockton University, South Jersey Gas and the AC 




Established in the 5th Amendment, eminent domain has been utilized as a tool for urban 
redevelopment since the 1950’s. In Burman v. Parker (1954) the Supreme Court held that 
condemnation could be used to take private property for a public purpose such as urban renewal 
(Robb, 2005 p.29). However modern interpretation allows condemnation to be utilized for a 
“public purpose”, beyond the original and stricter “public use” interpretation. The language used 
by the court only requires that a project is "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose" 
(Jones, 2000 p.2) and this lax standard for condemnation has resulted in a long-standing 
presumption that any private urban redevelopment project can serve a public purpose and 
therefore be a legal use of eminent domain. 
The negative public perception of regulatory takings by economic development entities 
means for the CRDA condemnation is only used as a “last resort” to take property after amicable 
negotiation fails (Zemansky, 2017). Without this government intervention, parcels owned by 
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individual property owners or speculative investors must be sold piecemeal to a developer 
thought singular negotiations, placing developers at the mercy of holdouts who despite large 
offers, refuse to sell their property. 
New Jersey utilized eminent domain for a variety of urban renewal projects, in the 1980’s 
and 1990’s. Condemnation provided private developers with the large parcels necessary for the 
expansion of extravagant casino developments without the delay or expense of negotiating 
buyouts. During this period the presumption that a development would serve some public 
purpose allowed for powerful special interest developers to pressure municipalities into utilizing 
condemnation for private gains and dubious public purposes (Jones, 2000 p.2). Infamously, in 
1998 the CRDA utilized its power of eminent domain on behalf of Donald J. Trump to condemn 
three properties, including a jewelry store and a family run restaurant to construct a “parking lot, 
stretch limo staging area and lawn” at the Trump Plaza Casino. This condemnation action 
“Trump and the CRDA claimed… constituted amenities of a sufficiently ‘public’ nature” to 
justify the taking (Jones, 2000 p.7). The relaxed definition of public good enabled Trump to 
“manipulate Atlantic City's power of eminent domain” (Egbert & Goldiner, 1998 p.5) claiming 
that the CRDA’s use of condemnation to construct the parking lot was a public benefit. 
Ultimately after a drawn out court battle the condemnation of the property was determined to be 
illegal, but the residents impacted had already left and closed their businesses. Seen in Figures 
6.1 and 6.2 the house of Vera Coking was one of the properties condemned by the CRDA in the 
1990’s and remained after the condemnation was ruled illegal despite the substantial 
development surrounding the property (CRDA v. Banin, 1997). 
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Figure 6.1 & 6.2 House of Vera Coking – Condemned by the CRDA for the development of the 
Trump Plaza Casino. Later this condemnation was ruled illegal and the house remained 
Even before the CRDA’s use of eminent domain for the Trump Casino, Atlantic City had 
felt the effects of eminent domain and urban renewal programs. During the 1960’s Pauline Hill, 
then Director of the Atlantic City Housing Authority, created the “Uptown Urban Renewal 
Tract” from a portion of the historically African-American Northside of Atlantic City. This 
project demolished large portions of the poor, but vibrant community in anticipation of large new 
development that would revitalize the city and its lagging tourist economy during the 1960’s. As 
a result of Hill’s efforts a new moniker was given to this district “Pauline’s Prairie”, in reference 
to the large and empty blocks of land demolished, but never rebuilt, which as seen in Figure 6.3 
remain even to this day. 
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Figure 6.3 The South Inlet neighborhood, Pauline’s Prairie and Revel Casino 
Since 2011 the CRDA has taken on its own similar large redevelopment effort in the 
Northside neighborhood, focusing on the 17 acre South Inlet district. First assisting in the 
condemnation of land to be used as part of the now defunct Revel development and most 
recently to develop the South Inlet Mixed-Use Development Project (SIMUD). As seen in Figure 
6.4 much of the property in the 17-acre South Inlet is already abandoned, primarily owned by 
property speculators waiting to be offered large sums for private redevelopment projects, 
however the CRDA also condemned numerous properties owned by Atlantic City residents as 
well, seen in Figure 6.5 
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Figure 6.4 Property Ownership within the South Inlet 
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Figure 6.5 CRDA property within the South Inlet Neighborhood 
 37 
According to an open letter provided by John Palmeri, former Executive Director of the 
CRDA, to the Press of Atlantic City, the CRDA currently owns 111 acres of property in Atlantic 
City, most of which is the undevelopable remains of road widening projects or already in use. 
According to Palmeri, only 8 acres of CRDA property are developable (Huba, 2017). Despite 
Palmeri’s characterization of CRDA property as minimal and undevelopable, since 2012 the 
CRDA has begun the acquisition of properties within the South Inlet neighborhood through 
buyouts and condemnation with the explicit intent to redevelop this area (Kramer, 2015). This 
has resulted in the CRDA’s possession of 2 acres of property the South Inlet including the 
majority of City Block 70, which has been totally demolished and is disused, seen in Figure 6.6. 
 
Figure 6.6 Sign posted on CRDA property of City Block 70 
Condemned by the CRDA to make way for the SIMUD was City Block 72, where the 
Vermont and Metro Plaza apartment complexes, and the business and home of longtime resident 
Charles Birnbaum are located. According to Palmeri, the project’s goal was to “spen[d] about $8 
million or $9 million assembling parcels, demolishing property, clearing sites and creating 
development parcels within the South Inlet” with the ultimate objective of laying “the 
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groundwork for some good development that will obviously require an improving economy to 
get done” (Huba, 2017). 
After legal action was taken against the CRDA’s taking the New Jersey Superior Court 
ruled in CRDA v. Birnbaum, holding that the CRDA’s condemnation of the property was “a 
manifest abuse of the eminent domain power, and exceed[ed] the CRDA’s statutory 
condemnation authority” denying the condemnation of these properties. The decision focused on 
the lack of explicit development plans for the site, concluding that the CRDA, instead of active 
economic development programming was engaged in “land banking” with no tangible or 
foreseeable public benefit (CRDA v. Birnbaum, 2016). Olga Polmar, Housing Preservation and 
Community Development Coordinator South Jersey Legal Services represented tenants of the 
Metro and Vermont Plaza apartment complexes, seen in Figure 6.7 as they faced condemnation. 
She explained that despite the invalidation of the CRDA’s use of eminent domain, the negative 
impacts of this action were still felt by the community. Many residents left the neighborhood 
after the original condemnation and attempted evictions, often to areas outside of Atlantic City. 
In addition despite the Court’s ruling the Birnbaum property was demolished. 
 
Figure 6.7 Vermont Plaza apartment complex 
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As explained by Elaine Zemansky the CRDA utilized eminent domain only as a last 
resort after other negotiation fails. But through interviews with CRDA officials, another 
motivation for condemnation arises. According to Chris Howard and Lance Landgraf, the use of 
eminent domain within the South Inlet was partially motivated by the perception that land 
speculators and not residents owned large numbers of properties within the neighborhood. 
CRDA director, Chris Howard stated “the property owners there, for the most part, were always 
holding out for some mega casino project…. nobody wanted to sell because there was always 
going to be the next big project” (Howard, 2017). While as seen in Figure 6.4 there is a high 
number of properties owned by speculative investors in the South Inlet, complicating the 
CRDA’s justification for condemnation is the lack of speculative investors found on Block 72. 
Instead of condemning properties owned by limited liability corporations (LLCs) or owners with 
out–of-town addresses, they condemned two housing developments for working African-
American residents, originally built with CRDA funding, and the house and office of a small 
business owner whose family had lived in Atlantic City for over 50 years.  
 
Practical Deliberation Analysis 
 
1. Program Verification 
 The CRDA’s use of eminent domain failed to acquire properties from speculative 
investors or create new economic development projects. Instead the CRDA engaged in a form of 
“land banking” acquiring properties while waiting for a developers to express interest in the 
vacant property. With the failure of the Revel project in addition to the City’s fiscal crisis, it was 
the Court’s opinion that the property would remain vacant without a public use to justify the 
condemnation. Solely acquiring land for a potential future project could not be viewed as a 
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public good. To this extent, what Palmeri set out to do in laying the groundwork for good 
development failed, as little private interest in the South Inlet existed. Despite the Court’s ruling, 
the CRDA still maintains that there is a demand for large development sites, thus justifying its 
use of condemnation. 
2. Situational Validation 
 Facing the collapse of the casino industry and failure of the Revel Casino development 
after only two years, it seems unlikely that the large-scale condemnation of residential properties 
could remedy the social and economic ills faced by Atlantic City. Previously the CRDA had 
utilized eminent domain to assist the Revel Casino in acquiring the development site in addition 
it condemned property to expand the City’s roadways to serve the anticipated traffic generated 
by the now shuttered casino.  Even after this project’s failure and the closure of so many casinos, 
the CRDA still considers eminent domain a viable redevelopment tool. During our interview 
Howard cited the Gateway project as an example of this demand for large development sites. 
While the project is set on a large 4-acre property, Howard’s use of this project to justify the 
CRDA condemnation is not valid as the Gateway project is being constructed on a large 
privately owned property, which did not require eminent domain in its development. In addition 
with the closure of so many casinos, Atlantic City now has numerous large potential 
development sites that do not require the condemnation of residential property. Developments 
utilizing these types of large sites are already occurring as evidenced by the Boraie development, 
a large affordable and market rate apartment complex being constructed on a now defunct 




3. Societal Vindication 
In examining the CRDA’s use of eminent domain it is important to not only evaluate the 
anticipated development outcomes of the program, but also the impacts on those whose property 
was condemned and the South Inlet neighborhood on a whole. While the CRDA argued that 
condemnation was necessary to break the hold of speculative investors who owned property in 
the South Inlet, the reality was that the CRDA condemned a small business and two apartment 
complexes with a large working class African-American community. Although the New Jersey 
Superior Court struck down the condemnation, the Birnbaum property was demolished and many 
residents left the community.  
 Olga Polmar, represented the Vermont and Metro Plaza tenants during the Court 
proceedings and added an additional perspective to the CRDA’s use of eminent domain. She 
contends that while eminent domain was unsuccessful at creating new large economic 
development projects, it was successful at removing poor and African American residents from 
the neighborhood. As Fainstein (2010) argues understanding whom beliefs from economic 
development policy is also crucial to evaluating a policy’s effectiveness at creating economic 
development. Condemnation is a strong power of the State, which inevitably has winners and 
losers. In the South Inlet, the CRDA’s use of eminent domain was implemented in the hope of 
selling the land to large private developers for the construction of new billion-dollar resorts and 
casinos. Through this exchange large private developers like Donald Trump, and Carl Icahn were 
set to benefit along with the State of New Jersey, which would receive large sums from the 
taxation of casino profits. In contrast the primarily working class tenants of those two affordable 
buildings were to be relocated as a result of the condemnation.  
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This decision to prioritize large developers and the State’s revenue is a common theme in 
the economic development of Atlantic City, as Polmar stated: “planning is not always done with 
my clients in mind. They are always the first to be overlooked because they do not have the 
funding and resources to have a voice to stand up to these organizations, especially the State” 
(Polmar, 2017). Ultimately no one benefited from this project, the residents moved and this 
neighborhood of Atlantic City became increasingly hollowed out and vacant.  
4. Social Choice 
The CRDA’s use of eminent domain in the South Inlet neighborhood was a highly 
unequal form of economic development. It placed a priority on large expensive development 
projects and State tax revenue over the development potential and livelihood of a forlorn and 
historically disenfranchised Atlantic City community. Similarly to the original “Pauline’s 
Prairie” urban renewal scheme in the 1960’s, which sought to redevelop the large and vibrant 
African American Northside neighborhood but failed, the South Inlet Mixed Use Development 
Project was ultimately unsuccessful at creating new development (Polmar, 2017; Johnson, 2010).  
Reflecting on her work representing tenants against the CRDA, Polmar expressed a long 
held feeling by the community that the policies and projects implemented by the CRDA are as 
much about removing the African American community from the South Inlet as they are about 
economic redevelopment, or perhaps more provocatively a structural belief in New Jersey 
economic development practice that getting rid of this community is necessary to create new 
economic development. “[The State’s interest] is to get rid of undervalued minority communities 
within Atlantic City. Making low income communities disappear, and replacing these 
communities with new development” (Polmar, 2017).  
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The use of eminent domain by the CRDA is neither compatible with social equity; nor is 
it appropriate for systemic change in Atlantic City. It ignores a historic and neglected community 
instead focusing on State financial and political interests. This policy remains committed to large 
billion dollar casino developments for economic development, even when there is no demand for 
this type of project within the city. In addition, the condemnation program actively opposes 
social equity and is understood by the community to be part of a larger historic urban renewal 
policy that has discriminated Atlantic City’s African American community. As Polmar states, 
“planning is not neutral and things we construe as failures can actually be successes” (Polmar, 
2017) Therefor CRDA’s actions must be evaluated as economic development for specific 
interests and not for the whole of Atlantic City. While the CRDA failed to bring development to 
the South Inlet through condemnation it was successful at condemning a local community, a 
negative impact of its pursuit of economic development. 
Ultimately the CRDA’s use of condemnation in the South Inlet was a drastic and 
damaging policy, ruled illegal by the New Jersey Superior Court. It removed long-time residents 
in favor of large casino developers, whose developments “turn their back on Atlantic City”, and 
encourage decline outside of their facilities in order to keep people gambling (Polmar, 2017; 
Atlantic City Resident, 2017). Moreover the CRDA’s use of condemnation has historically 
contributed to the decline in residential housing stock, and the increase in speculative property 
owners; the justification cited for the CRDA’s use of condemnation originally. As the State takes 
property, landlords interested in renting their property to residents are discouraged from 
maintaining their properties at the risk of condemnation and instead opt to sell their property to 
speculators.  
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Moving towards a critical approach to economic development planning the use of 
eminent domain must be scrutinized. Too often, particularly in Atlantic City it has been used to 
support private non-resident developers engaged in large unsuccessful casino developments, at 
the expense of Atlantic City residents who face eviction, and the loss of their small businesses. 
While large casinos have the potential to generate increased tax revenue for the State, they are 
not successful at expanding or developing the city’s economy. Instead Atlantic City must seek to 
preserve the residential properties it has and encourage working and middle class residents to 




 States utilize tax breaks, grant funding and a variety of other financing tools to 
incentivize economic development and promote investment in areas that are not being developed 
by the market. The provision of funds is intended to limit a project’s risk, which would otherwise 
preclude development from occurring. State development entities create highly customized 
incentive programs aimed at attracting and retaining specific industries or promoting particular 
forms of economic development. Often these incentives also include performance metrics 
included to ensure projects that use incentives and public funds are going about development 
responsibly and in a manner deemed appropriate by the State (James, 1984). In Atlantic City, 
two distinct economic development agencies and incentive regimes are in place to promote 
development.  
The New Jersey Economic Development Authority (NJEDA) incentivizes development 
through its Economic and Redevelopment Growth Program (ERG), a performance based tax 
credit provided to eligible developments that fit a variety of criteria, including specific 
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“locational requirements” and that “demonstrate a project funding gap.” Commercial 
development projects are also subject to “net benefit analysis to verify that the revenues the State 
receives will be greater than the incentive being provided” (NJEDA, 2014 p.4). The ERG 
program also includes performance requirements for projects including providing evidence of 
actual project costs and project completion. In 2014, Atlantic City was included as a Garden 
State Growth Zone, “extending various enhanced benefits” to the City, previously only provided 
to Camden, New Jersey (NJEDA, 2014 p.5).  
The second incentive program is the CRDA’s Investment Alternative Tax (IAT) for 
development projects which support CRDA goals and objectives. However since mid-2016, IAT 
funds have been directed to the City of Atlantic City to finance the City’s municipal debt service 
(NJ Rev Stat 5:12-144.1, 2013). Unlike NJEDA funds, the IAT funds come from casino 
revenues, with each casino required by law to reinvest 1.25% of its yearly gaming revenue into 
redevelopment projects. The CRDA then utilizes these funds to support a variety of development 
goals through specific funds, including the $75 million Casino Hotel Expansion Fund that, since 
1993, has “leveraged more than $1 billion in hotel expansion projects” (CRDA, 2017). Projects 
are eligible for IAT incentives if they cannot attract capital in “normal market conditions” and 
serve “pressing social and economic needs of local residents…” or are “public recreation and 
entertainment facilities, to promote the tourism industry” along and other economic development 
objectives (CRDA, 2017). Utilized in conjunction, the ERG and IAT programs have been 
utilized to assist the development of multiple projects in Atlantic City including the Tropicana 
Boardwalk Improvements, the Revel Hotel and Casino and Gateway campus. These projects 
have all had varying levels of success, with some contributing to the development of Atlantic 
City.  
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The Tropicana project doesn’t reflect all development projects that have utilized ERG 
and IAT funding, but demonstrates the pressing concerns and ambiguities associated with these 
programs and New Jersey’s existing economic development policies. In 2014, the Tropicana 
Atlantic City Corporation applied for both ERG and IAT incentives to develop a new project on 
the Atlantic City Boardwalk. The project, described in a NJEDA Grant Memorandum from 
September 11th 2014, included substantial facility improvements to the Tropicana Casino and 
Resort. The project included installation of a new outdoor interactive LED display, 7,350 square 
feet (sf) of new retail development, and a new 12,080 sf fitness center to be used by Tropicana 
guests. 
As seen in Figure 6.8 the NJEDC’s memo puts the cost of these improvements at an 
estimated $35 million, of which the State would contribute $4,849,075, or 14.5% of total cost, 
through the ERG program. CRDA contributed $1.5 million for façade improvements and an 
additional $17.3 million was contributed through IAT funding. The total State contribution to the 
project was $23,649,075 or 67% of the project’s total need, leaving $11,350,925 to be covered 
by Tropicana (NJEDA, 2014). 
 
In order to evaluate the project’s economic impact the NJEDC conducted a net positive 
benefit analysis as per NJSA 19:31-4.5, in order to determine its eligibility for the ERG program. 
Its analysis concluded that the net positive benefit of the project would include 61 new full time 
positions, with an annual blended wage of $28,003 before benefits, and a yearly generation of 
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$1.7 million in payroll: in total the State would receive a total net positive benefit of $4.8 million 
over the 20 year term of the ERG tax credits a rate of return of about 1% per annum.  
The CRDA also conducted an impact analysis to determine the project’s eligibility for 
IAT. Unfortunately documentation of the IAT economic impact analysis for this project was not 
provided. Other IAT proposals, obtained through New Jersey’s OPRA such as those for the 
Boraie and Gateway developments include little more than the developer supplied market 
research and the development pro-forma, and no economic impact analysis.  
During an interview conducted with the CRDA Lance Landgraf, the CRDA’s director of 
planning indicated that the Tropicana project was considered a success by the CRDA. Landgraf 
explained that “[Tropicana] really raised the bar completely… you go down, walk on the 
boardwalk and from here [CRDA offices] you can see their lights, those electronic LED boards” 
(Landgraf, 2017). As seen in Figure 6.9 the Tropicana Casino greatly expanded its Boardwalk 
level retail space and created a new entrance into its casino as part of these improvements.   
 
Figure 6.9 Tropicana retail expansion 
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While Landgraf provides anecdotal evidence of the project’s success as a beacon for 
tourist visitors, the lack of clear economic development evaluation conducted by the CRDA is 
concerning, especially considering its substantial $18 million (51% of total project costs) 
investment in the project. Christopher Howard, the CRDA’s executive director, explained that 
“economic development is tricky math” and that the CRDA utilizes “generally accepted 
principles in computing economic development impact” (Howard, 2017), but could provide no 
detail as to the specific types of analysis conducted by the CRDA to determine the net impact of 
the Tropicana project, or other projects funded by the IAT.  
Howard and Landgraf did elaborate on the procedure by which a project’s economic 
development potential is analyzed: “first the[the applicant] presents a market study to our staff… 
we then vet it with Chris [Howard], with the executive director, the applicant then comes in and 
meets with Bunny [Rexley, Director of Real Estate & Development], then after these meetings 
Chris will come in and say ‘Okay, this is a project where we can at least vet out’” (Landgraf, 
2017). After this vetting process the CRDA then typically goes over the developer’s pro-forma 
and market research, but as Howard noted what they are looking for in a project “really depends 
on what the project is.” When asked about what occurs after IAT funding has been provided, 
specifically regarding what types of evaluation are completed to determine a project’s success, 
Howard explained that “CRDA funding generally has no strings attached, aside from 
benchmarks they have to meet, like construction of the project, or like a completion date” 
(Howard, 2017). These responses demonstrate the lack of measures in place to evaluate the 
success of development projects or ensure that specific projects are the best use of the substantial 
state-controlled money being provided. Moreover the lack of post-development evaluation 
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prevents the CRDA from learning where projects potentially were unsuccessful and how to 
correct or better vet future development projects. 
 
Practical Deliberation Analysis 
 
1. Program Verification 
The incentives provided for the Tropicana property improvements resulted in the 
construction of the additional retail development, a fitness center and boardwalk LED signboard. 
According to Landgraf, this project was successful because the LED boards now make the casino 
a larger attraction and improve the utilization of the southern portion of the Boardwalk, which 
has been in decline since the closure of other casinos in the area. In addition the project has been 
successful at creating an increased number of jobs for Atlantic City as outlined by the ERG net 
benefits analysis conducted by the NJEDA. Therefor the program successfully met its 
verification goals of creating new jobs and building new commercial space.  
2. Situational Validation 
Steadily decreasing gaming revenues and the closure of multiple casinos since 2014 have 
contributed heavily to the contemporary economic collapse of Atlantic City. The goal of the 
2012 Tourism District Master Plan was to transition away from gaming as the primary source of 
revenue and to increase tourism from non-gaming activities such as shopping and other 
attractions. In this effort, the Tropicana project has made a positive contribution because it 
improves the amenities provided to tourists through additional retail opportunities. However, the 
project remains tied to the precarious casino economy and reliant on the overall success of the 
Tropicana Casino. While the creation of additional retail amenities, outside of casino gaming, is 
validated as an appropriate remedy to the ills facing Atlantic City, in context the overall reliance 
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on casino success invalidates the project’s potential for success and overall ability to address the 
larger economic challenges faced by Atlantic City. 
3. Societal Vindication 
Societal vindication seeks to evaluate a project’s overall value as a solution to economic 
decline (Fischer, 1992). Utilizing this criterion for evaluation, the Tropicana project’s overall 
contribution is very low and highly unequal in whom it supports. As articulated in the NJEDA’s 
net positive benefit analysis, the project’s benefits include 61 new jobs with an annual blended 
wage of $28,003. While an improvement from zero jobs, the project does little to provide real 
opportunities for those employed beyond potentially qualifying for public assistance; a lackluster 
result considering the substantial economic development incentives that were put into the 
project. With a blended wage of $28,003 per job the 61 persons employed would on average 
receive $38 less than the 2012 Atlantic City median income of 28,041, which is already 2.4 times 
less than the New Jersey median income at the time of evaluation in 2012. In addition the 
NJEDA stressed that the City’s median wage is already precariously low primarily due to the 
collapsing casino economy (NJEDA, 2014). The project’s average pay is only 51% of Atlantic 
City’s 2015 area median income (AMI) of $54,052 and only 38% of New Jersey’s AMI (US 
Census Bureau, 2015).  
Analyzing the amount of subsidy provided per job demonstrates an extreme imbalance in 
incentives awarded versus economic development returned. The $23.6 million total in economic 
development incentives provided by the NJEDA and CRDA combined amount to a government 
expenditure of $387,689 per job created, 13 years of employment at the project’s average wage, 
or seven years of employment for each worker at the Atlantic City AMI. In total from the 
provision of these incentives, the State anticipates a total return of $4.8 million from its 
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expenditure of incentives over the 20-year life of the ERG tax incentives and includes no 
community benefits agreement or other economic development provisions.  
Societal vindication also requires an analysis of whom this project benefits. From 
exploration of the wage distribution of the project, Atlantic City workers are not included as 
beneficiaries. Little is done to improve the condition of workers already considered low income 
by the NJEDA who at best are potentially eligible for public assistance while working. 
Beneficiaries of this program include the Tropicana Casino, which can now generate increased 
revenue from the new retail spaces and bring new tourists to the casino and the State that assisted 
in the creation of 61 new jobs and will receive an additional $4.8 million in tax revenue over the 
term of these tax credits.  
4. Social Choice 
The Tropicana’s project is incompatible with larger issues of social equity and systematic 
change faced by Atlantic City. With the City’s fiscal crisis, skyrocketing residential property tax 
evaluations, and the collapse of the casino economy, continued State investment in casino-based 
development is neither certain to be successful, nor does it promote new types of economic 
development. The Tropicana project provides new revenue for the struggling casino while 
providing poor wages at great cost to the State.  
From the social equity perspective, the Tropicana project also fails to promote economic 
development: as the employment opportunities provided are not substantial enough to warrant 
State investment. Analysis of average wages indicates that the jobs created are far from 
sustainable or stable. First, the seasonality of the tourism industry means positions are often laid 
off in the fall and rehired again in the spring, creating inconsistent and unstable employment. 
Second, the provided wage falls substantially below the Atlantic City AMI and does little to 
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create new economic opportunities for low-income residents. The State subsidy for this project is 
quite large compared to the number of jobs created and provides no guarantees that the project 
will remain successful over the lifetime of the incentive. Instead, it utilizes state funds to 
subsidize a failing economic model without significant economic analysis to justify the 
incentive.   
The State of New Jersey has placed a significant amount of effort into providing 
opportunities for economic redevelopment in Atlantic City. Both through the CRDA and 
NJEDA, significant amounts of State controlled funds and tax breaks exist to provide developers 
incentives to engage in projects that will improve the economy and provide opportunities to 
reorient and revitalize the city’s economy. Unfortunately the funds provided are not being 
utilized efficiently, resulting in the State’s expenditure of significant financial resources on 
projects that do little to improve the economic condition of residents or cause a systematic shift 
in the city’s economy away from casino development towards a more sustainable and diverse 
economy.  
Moreover, State economic development entities failed to adequately coordinate different 
incentive regimes such as those used at the Tropicana. In this project, the State, through its 
various entities, provided 67% of the project’s expenses $18 million in grant money and another 
$4.5 million in tax credits. While the NJEDA analyzed the project funding need and total eligible 
costs, it did not consider the IAT funding when determining the project’s eligible need, thereby, 
greatly inflating the amount of funding provided to the project.  
Crucially, the provision of IAT funding by the CRDA lacked any economic impact 
analysis to determine project eligibility for funding and further provided incentives without a 
clear understanding of the projects economic impacts and social purpose. Both in the project 
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vetting process and economic benefits evaluation, the CRDA lacks consistent and objective 
criteria for economic impact analysis, instead relying on the market analysis provided by 
developers to justify project support. These issues have led to the allocation of substantial IAT 
funding to projects without a coherent development strategy that can be evaluated or modified 
based on past successes and failures, instead the CRDA relies on private developers to set and 
frame a projects potential economic impact. 
State funding as formerly provided by the CRDA’s IAT and currently provided by the 
NJEDA ERG do little to guarantee community or economic benefits from the development 
projects they fund, instead relying on developer supplied market research and financing 
documents to determine a project’s viability and eligibility for funds. While this analysis may 
support a project’s financial viability in a limited context, it does little to establish a project’s 
potential contribution to economy development. Additionally, the State does nothing to include 
any economic development goals or programming into the ERG or IAT requirements instead it 
allows applicants to provide minimum public benefits at great private benefit. With such large 
amounts of funding being provided for these private projects, the State should include more 
public benefits into these incentive programs, such as providing a living wage.  
 
Public Private Partnerships 
 
 Beyond traditional urban renewal programs and incentive regimes, economic 
development practitioners now engage in public private partnerships (PPP) which seek to 
leverage synergies between public powers and private capital to create new mixed use projects 
that include large public benefits (Blais, 2007 p.682) in contrast to incentives, which attempt to 
spur private investment through public spending.  
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 PPPs combine unique advantages available only to public entities, such as low interest 
loans, municipal bonds and tax exemption with private advantages such as access to capital and 
professional expertise in order to create opportunities for both corporate profits and public 
benefits. PPPs can be contentious as they create profit motives from public interest but even 
detractors such a Stephenson (1991), who criticized PPPs efficiency and equity, do not preclude 
them from being successful economic development vehicles (Larken, 1994 p.1). Additionally 
PPPs “distribute shared risk and responsibility in a more balanced way [than traditional public-
private agreements]… PPPs also extend to potential financial benefits generated from the 
arrangements” (Opp & Osgood, 2013 p.131) creating new financial benefits to a project 
otherwise inaccessible to either the public or private party.   
Seen in Figure 6.10 currently under construction, Atlantic City’s “Gateway” project is a 
complex partnership between a number of public and private entities, creating a four-acre mixed-
use redevelopment project in Atlantic City’s Chelsea neighborhood. The Gateway project’s main 
tenant and primary public partner is Stockton University (SU), a public university located across 
Absecon Bay in Galloway, NJ. Once complete in fall 2018, Stockton will operate a full branch 
campus, including a 533-bed residence hall, 56,000 sf of programmable academic space, 2,600 sf 
for a “coffee shop concept” and 5,000 sf for a restaurant or other student focused retail. Adjacent 
to the Stockton facility South Jersey Gas (SJG) is constructing a new corporate headquarters on 
top of an 870 space-parking garage. In addition to these two entities, the PPP also includes the 
private non-profit AC DevCo, which owned the development site and serves as the construction 
manager during the build out phase of the development.  
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Figure 6.10 Rendering of the Gateway Campus provided by Stockton University 
Typical of PPPs project financing is highly complex and expansive arrangement relying 
on “a patchwork of public and private financing” which is broken down by agency, amount and 
type of funding in Figure 6.11 (Jackson, 2017). The Gateway project seeks to become an “anchor 
institution” for the Chelsea neighborhood bringing new investment and activity to the southern 
section of the City. SU already has a substantial presence as explained by Brian Jackson, the 
Chief Operating Officer for Stockton’s Gateway Campus, through its provision of higher and 
continuing education programs in the city and as a key sponsor of the City’s Arts and Culture 
district in the Ducktown neighborhood. In Jackson’s view this large expansion will continue 
SU’s long-term commitment to Atlantic City.  
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 In the programing the Gateway Campus, SU developed a set of goals and outcomes, it 
hopes to achieve as the project comes online. First, SU intends to hire Atlantic City residents as 
much as possible, which it has already begun doing through a training program managed by the 
construction company, which hired “15 individuals from AC and put them through an extensive 
training program so they can be construction workers” (Jackson, 2017). In addition to future 
workers hired by SU, SJG will provide, increased opportunities for local employment at a variety 
of wages and skill levels.  
 Another economic development component of the Gateway project can be found in its 
dormitory programming. All 538 dorms will be ‘apartment style’, and include full kitchens 
allowing students to live independently. In addition, leases for these apartments will be for 12 
months instead of the more traditional 9-month academic year enticing students to live year-
round in Atlantic City. As Jackson explains this programming was an intentional part of the large 
redevelopment project. “[The campus] is engaged year round, we are linked to the community. 
We didn’t want to come in and fence ourselves off from the rest of the community… that’s not 
who we want to be, that’s not who we are” (Jackson, 2017). The elimination of dining services 
and provision of full kitchens in the apartments will require students to shop in local 
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supermarkets, and go out to local restaurants, promoting spending off campus in local 
businesses. 
 To complement its economic development programming Stockton is also developing 
extensive educational programs that focus on community engagement and the creation of 
professional opportunities for students through work training at a variety of businesses, including 
SJG and AtlantiCare, the regional hospital. Jackson explained, “we see the opportunity of having 
a larger physical presence here as an opportunity to really expand the kinds of community work 
we can do here in AC. Our students are really into that… we have a reputation for community 
engagement”. Further Gateway will expand opportunities for higher education for low-income 
residents who cannot afford to leave the city to access higher education. Jackson elaborated, “We 
want residents of AC… to know that there is an opportunity to be educated here… this gives 
them an opportunity to see a future for themselves as future SU students”.  
Practical Deliberation Analysis 
 
1. Program verification  
 The Gateway project is programmed to expand educational opportunities for Atlantic 
City residents as well as bring a new student population to the city. The project also brings SJG’s 
headquarters to Atlantic City, along with 8,000 sf of retail development. The goal is the creation 
of a new vibrant educational and professional community in the Chelsea neighborhood; 
implementation also focuses on creating a variety of private development opportunities in 
coordination with SU and the larger Gateway campus. The design of campus spaces promotes 
opportunities for the community to engage with the campus and new population. Further, SU has 
the goal of becoming an anchor institution within Atlantic City, generating increased public and 
private investment in the area adjacent to campus and around the whole city. Already since the 
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project started, it has sparked interest from other developers including the renovation of a nearby 
building which will become one of a few market rate housing developments in Atlantic City.  
2. Situational validation 
 Facing casino closures and skyrocketing residential property evaluations Atlantic City is 
in dire need of a shift in its economy away from casinos and tourism. Diversification of the 
economy is paramount for the city to recover from its current financial crisis and steep decline. 
The Trump Taj Mahal’s closure in 2016 caused 3,000 people to lose their jobs, increasing the 
already high unemployment rate (DeAngelis, 2016). Figures 6.12 quantifies the fluctuation in 
Atlantic City’s unemployment rate since 1970 and the legalization of casino gaming in 1976, 
through the 2008 financial crisis. Figure 6.13 quantifies the quarterly fluctuation of the City’s 
unemployment rate, which shifts dramatically throughout the year with the unemployment rate 
peaking during winter months and decreasing during the busy summer season.  
Unlike other development underway, which relies on tourism and the casino economy, 
Gateway seeks to expand economic opportunities to a number of other sectors, including 
professional services and advanced education. This diversification is desperately needed and 
Jackson’s hope is that the Gateway project will be able to rectify both the job and income 
imbalances, which have become retrenched in Atlantic City over the past 10 years.  
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An additional goal for Gateway is the regeneration of Atlantic City as a vibrant and 
active city, where people enjoy the city and its public spaces, as opposed to the current condition 
where visitors remain in casinos and feel unsafe walking around the city. To Jackson, a 
consequence of the city’s economic hardship and decline is a culture of hostility. With renewed 
investment and new community engagement programs, Jackson hopes some of this hostility and 
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the public safety issues felt by city residents will be reduced and give way to a vibrant social 
culture. Jackson pointed out his office window to the empty and trash strewn O’Donnell 
Memorial Park, and outlined work underway to improve the park, “we want to fully re-engage 
the park… it’s very under-utilized, so we have students working with me to come up with 
concepts about how we can re-engage the park. We want people on the streets, it gives people a 
sense of community and safety” (Jackson, 2017). As Jane Jacobs outlines in Death and Life of 
Great American Cities Jackson believes the Gateway project can contribute to a social society 
within the city providing more eyes on the street, as well as, programming to reverse the sense of 
institutional abandonment felt by many Atlantic City residents.  
3. Societal vindication 
 Gateway seeks increased opportunities for education in Atlantic City. For many years the 
city had experienced bran-drain as few, who left the city seeking higher education, return to live 
and work. As stated by one resident “increasingly Atlantic City has less of a talent pool to pull 
qualified leaders from, anyone from the City who could go onto do great things does so 
somewhere else” (Atlantic City Resident, 2017). To counter this, Gateway will provide 
opportunities for city residents and new students to learn and receive advanced degrees within 
the city. The focus on engagement opportunities for students and the community could create 
new investment in the city and provide students and young adult’s opportunities to advance 
professionally within the city.  
 Gateway will create new jobs on site and expand and promote redevelopment around the 
adjacent neighborhood, which has already begun with Stockton receiving expressions of interest 
from private firms seeking to create opportunities in conjunction with Gateway. Ultimately the 
Stockton partnership aims to generate a new group of educated Atlantic City residents as well as 
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opportunities for non-casino based job growth, significantly contributing to new social 
organization within the city. 
4. Social choice  
 The Gateway project seeks to bring systematic change to the city in three distinct ways: 
First, it intends to introduce a new economic sector and jobs outside of the casino industry. 
Service jobs not tied to seasonal tourism will instead focus on a year round industry potentially 
breaking the cycle of seasonal unemployment and limited job security faced by city residents.  
 Second, Gateway will increase opportunities for education in Atlantic City, previously 
inaccessible to many. Atlantic City suffers from extreme brain drain with few opportunities for 
higher education, which has resulted in a small pool of professional or skilled workers within the 
city. With increasing frequency positions that require high-educations are being filled by non-
residents commuting into the city for work (Jackson, 2017; Howard, 2017; Atlantic City 
Resident, 2017). New educational programs at SU should provide a stronger native professional 
workforce within the city.  
 Third, Gateway seeks to anchor private development in the Chelsea neighborhood, and its 
programming is directed towards creating opportunities for redevelopment. Unlike 
redevelopment plans focused on highly insular casinos, Gateway seeks to be an open campus 
with amenities for both students and the existing community. Jackson makes it clear that creating 
a community that utilizes these new public amenities in productive ways is a major goal of the 
project.   
 In comparison to the use of eminent domain and the provision of state incentives this PPP 
serves as an example of progressive and comprehensive economic development. The approach to 
this project was both as an individual site development, and as a larger portion of the 
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development of the community and city. It also shows that state funds are still absolutely vital to 
the implementation of good development projects, but that the State needs to be engaged and 
active in creating and supporting this type of economic development projects, as opposed to 
other types it has previously funded.  
While there is hope for the Gateway project to be a success, particularly in comparison to 
other recent development within the city, as Brian Jackson discussed this is only one project of 
many which are needed to truly revitalize Atlantic City’s economy and make it a successful 

















Since the legalization of casino gaming in the 1970’s the State of New Jersey has been in 
a process of constant intervention and adjustment with the economy of Atlantic City.  Each 
decade has brought a new development strategy, entity, or policy intended to fix the 
shortcomings of those that came previously. Yet without the necessary critical approach to 
evaluating economic development practices these interventions have resulted in the creation of 
new development challenges to be surmounted at the expense of vast government funds. Instead 
of continuing 40 years of mistakes and mishaps a new strategy for economic development based 
on a holistic evaluation of the State’s previous economic development practices is required. 
Many of the policies implemented after 2011 repeat the failures of the previous decades, 
with the CRDA constantly trying and retrying development strategies with the same results. 
Recent use of eminent domain by the CRDA mimics what was done during the 1990’s to support 
the development of the Trump Plaza Casino. In both CRDA v. Birnbaum and CRDA v. Banin the 
condemnations were ruled illegal by the State superior court, but still resulted in the closure of 
Atlantic City businesses. In response to the failure of casino driven economic development the 
CRDA’s most recent efforts to create a new State-controlled Atlantic City Tourism District is 
trying to bring Atlantic City’s economy back to the 1960’s before gambling was legalized, the 
failure of which was the impetus for legalizing casino gaming during the 1970’s. All of this 
indicative of the inability for the CRDA as an economic development entity to evaluate or reflect 
on its previous successes and failures in order to improve and adapt its economic development 
policy. Instead falling to the same flawed methodology utilized in previous decades. Economic 
development goals of creating new jobs, raising property values, and creating State revenue must 
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include more substantial theoretical and analytical basis in their implementation, which has been 
lacking in New Jersey’s economic development policy in the city over the past 40 years. 
 After studying the use of urban renewal, state incentives and public-private partnerships 
as strategies for economic development, it is clear that substantial changes to the economic 
development policies undertaken in Atlantic City need to occur if the city’s economy is to 
stabilize and grow. The State of New Jersey, as the primary entity involved in the economic 
development of Atlantic City needs to undertake the following recommendations if it seeks to 
improve Atlantic City’s economy and resolve the City’s current fiscal crisis.  
 
Recommendation 1. The State must transition Atlantic City’s economy away from casino 
gaming and casino tourism.  
Recent failures of the casino industry coupled with its damaging relationship to Atlantic 
City workers and residents makes it clear that this 40 year grand experiment in economic 
development has failed. Further, the city cannot rely on new casino-based tourism to bring back 
the economy. While there has been a move away from gaming to tourism the location of the 
activities remains focused on casinos, designed to promote gambling and whose primary 
business is gambling. In addition the seasonality of this tourist economy creates inconsistent 
growth and employment, with summer peaks and winter troughs. Instead, those engaged in 
economic development must to seek out opportunities for year-round employment including 
those offered by institutions like Stockton University, South Jersey Gas, Atlantic City’s Aviation 
Research Center and other opportunities that may arise.  
Crucial to redevelopment is the diversification of the economy in order to protect the city 
from industry-specific shocks, and provide expanded opportunities for community wide growth. 
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Economic development policy and planning should instead focus on increasing the community’s 
economic capacity by supporting a living wage, providing new training, and programs for 
educational advancement.  
The Gateway project serves, as a strong example for how economic development 
practitioners must think about new public and private development projects in the larger 
community context. As Brian Jackson indicated Gateway was planned both as a university 
campus, and to be an anchor institution for the further redevelopment of Atlantic City. The 
partnership, which developed the project, understood that there were many ways that the project 
could contribute to the community. Included in the Gateway project are new community benefits 
including public space improvements, such as new programming for the Memorial Park, a local 
jobs training program and expanded educational opportunities for Atlantic City residents and 
workers. In contrast to the Tropicana Boardwalk improvement project, which only expanded the 
revenue opportunities for the singular casino, Stockton and the AC DevCo seek to actively 
improve the future health and prosperity of the city’s economy and community.  
  
Recommendation 2. The State of New Jersey must stop prioritizing growth and increased tax 
revenue in favor of an economic development strategy that focuses on creating large community 
benefits and opportunities for community wide economic advancement. New State development 
programs must avoid contributing to the City’s economic and financial problems and instead 
seek to address the negative effects of the State’s 40 year mismanagement of Atlantic City’s 
economic development.  
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Recommendation 2a. New Jersey must stop utilizing condemnation to support large private 
casino development in Atlantic City.  
The CRDA’s use of condemnation to support large casino developers has failed to bring 
substantive economic development to Atlantic City, instead this policy has damaged Atlantic 
City’s neighborhoods. In the 1990’s, it was used to build Donald Trump a limo staging area and 
small-planted grassland; most recently it was used to condemn property for nebulous public 
benefit tied to large private casino development. In both instances, it was challenged in court and 
determined to be an illegal taking, damaging the effectiveness of the CRDA, which is now 
locked in a legal battle against the community. Moreover, in both instances small businesses, 
owned by long-time residents were condemned in favor of large corporate developers or the hope 
of large corporate development. Further, the use of eminent domain has contributed to the drastic 
decline of the city’s housing stock and departure of working and middle class residents to 
Atlantic County’s suburbs or other regions entirely. Without these groups returning to the 
community, Atlantic City will never be able to rebuild a strong diverse economy of 
professionals, small business owners and workers. 
While the CRDA contends that condemnation is needed to create large development sites 
for substantial projects there are other ways for the CRDA to utilize this power responsibly and 
without some of the substantial negative impacts, which have come out of its recent use. First, 
with the closure of so many casino developments the city already faces a glut of large and 
disused development sites that sit on prime ocean front property. Both the Gateway project and 
new Boraie residential development utilize these types of sites formerly controlled by casinos 
without the need condemn blocks of residential property for their creation. It should be a priority 
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of the CRDA to reclaim and reuse these now-shuttered casino sites for economic development 
purposes, before the condemnation of residential properties owned and lived in by city residents.  
Second if eminent domain is to occur in Atlantic City, the State must include protections 
for Atlantic City residents, particularly protection from skyrocketing property assessments based 
on speculative property ownership. The history of extreme property speculation based on large 
project condemnations has consistently contributed to the decline of the city’s residential 
communities. The imbalance between the use and exchange value of casino adjacent property 
must be reduced in order to maintain a robust and affordable residential housing market. Too 
many middle class residents, who could contribute to the expansion of Atlantic City’s economy, 
have been displaced by this process and now cannot afford to live within the city.  
Crucial to creating a strong economy in Atlantic City will be the rebuilding of those 
working and middle class communities. This can only happen when the city has a stable 
residential property market protected from land speculators and the skyrocketing property taxes 
currently faced by residents, which have come as a result of the failures of casino development. 
Those engaged in economic development, including Chris Howard and Brian Jackson, cited 
these issues as being the prime barriers to creating renewed interest in the city as a place to live.  
 
Recommendation 2b. The State must develop and coordinate a consistent and unified economic 
development strategy in Atlantic City that includes robust and systematic analysis of the 
potential economic impacts and outcomes of economic development projects. This strategy 
should also include explicit community benefits agreements to be included in any development 
project funded by the State of New Jersey or which utilizes any funds controlled by the State.  
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Currently State development entities including the CRDA and NJEDA lack the 
coordination to ensure State funds are being used efficiently and effectively. Limited 
coordination of funds has allowed large private projects, such as that at the Tropicana to be 
majority funded by the state with little public benefits or State oversight. Both the NJEDA and 
CRDA provide significant economic development funding, but this lack of coordination, and 
robust development analysis has allowed for significant funds to be used on projects without 
robust vetting or economic analysis of potential success or community returns.  
 In principal the purpose of State incentives, grants, and tax credits is to assist the funding 
of projects, which would not have been successful otherwise, to be developed. However, when 
the State supports a majority of a private development’s costs without a clear vision for how 
economic development should occur, or a method to evaluate the impacts of a project, the State 
is unable to determine which development projects are worth the expense of State resources and 
which are not, instead funding both the good and the bad. The State’s lack of coherent evaluative 
methods, or a comprehensive vision for what it can achieve through its economic development 
entities, has allowed the State to provide substantial funding for subpar economic development 
projects such as the Tropicana improvements or Margaretville beachside bar, which do little to 
improve or change the economic condition of Atlantic City.   
Recommendation 3. The State of New Jersey should return municipal control, including 
economic development and land use planning to the City of Atlantic City. Since the legalization 
of casino gaming in 1976 New Jersey has created various agencies to control substantial aspects 
of the city’s economy, planning and economic development. Critics of the State’s involvement 
cite casino gaming as a larger win for the State than City, with Trenton collecting revenues from 
its taxes on casino profits for education and other government projects, at the expense of the city 
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which hosts these casinos and has felt the negative impacts of the casino economy most 
severally.  
Beyond the State’s mismatched financial interest in Atlantic City there is skepticism 
surrounding the current administrations intentions in Atlantic City. Considering New Jersey’s 
record of favoring corporate development and developers over the working class, poor and 
African-American residents of Atlantic City many community representatives are concerned that 
the economic development programming currently undertaken by the State are not in the 
communities best interest, but instead the interests of corporate developers and State politicians 
profiting off of Atlantic City’s misfortune and mismanagement.   
Bringing economic and land use controls back to the City would allow the community to 
determine how the City should undertake economic development. Consistent involvement by the 
State in the Northside and South Inlet indicate that the City’s African-American community is 
not a priority of the State in contrast to large developers and real estate projects and this 
imbalance between popular and political interest justifies the return of power back to the City. 
Considering the precarious financial position of the City due to a history of bad and unexamined 
State policies it is vital that the community is able to find itself a new economic path without the 









 New Jersey’s use of economic development planning within Atlantic City serves as a 
prime example of the difficulties encountered by economic development practitioners, as both 
experts engaging in professional planning and participants in the highly political process of 
economic development. In Atlantic City like across the United States the highly ambiguous 
nature of economic development means programming is often developed with good intentions, 
but with bad measures. Without coordinated development vision or a robust framework to 
evaluate the economic viability of development policies, development entities such as the CRDA 
are able to approve substantial development projects with dubious merits or ulterior political 
motivations.  
 As an extension of the State economic development entities must also engage in a 
political process that prioritizes certain types of economic growth over more comprehensive 
forms of community economic development. The result of this political pressure is the promotion 
and development of politically appealing projects, which lack substantive theoretical backing. 
This precarious position is seen in Atlantic City where the State support of the casino economy 
has been legislated as the primary goal of the CRDA, even though the casino economy has failed 
to bring substantial economic benefits to Atlantic City.  
 To be effective at creating substantive economic development, practitioners must take on 
a more critical and holistic approach to economic development planning, instead of a highly 
politically motivated form of economic development practice. This approach would seeks to 
evaluate the impacts and consequences of potential development projects, understanding that 
evaluation must include negative impacts and outcomes as well as those which are positive. 
Planners must also review previously implemented development practices in order to evaluate 
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their success, both in the short term after implementation, but also over the course of the 
incentive offered.  
Development planners utilize strong state powers and large amounts of public funds to 
create economic development, there for it is important that these substantive analysis and 
evaluation are included as good governance practices in economic development and 
policymaking. The expansive powers given to economic development entities, including the 
CRDA, must require substantive evaluations of policy to ensure that these powers are being used 
in the people’s best interests and not for ulterior motivations. Economic development entities 
should not have cart blanche to enact development policy without substantial evaluation and 
analysis of policy effectiveness. Finally including critical analysis into economic development 
planning is critical to ensure economic development does not privilege or prioritize the specific 
interests of groups other all others within a community. Instead the vast powers of economic 
development planning should be utilized to increase opportunities for communitywide success 
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